This research is concerned with maximizing the clearance rate (CR) of reputation-aware (RA) auctions for assigning tasks in mobile crowdsensing (MCS) systems-CR refers to the percentage of items that are sold over the duration of the auction. Towards maximizing CR during task allocation, we propose two new bidding procedures. Through simulations under varying system parameters, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the suggested methods through consistent and considerable increases in the CR compared to the state-of-the-art.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in the pervasive computing paradigm have had stimulated Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS). Through sensorequipped mobile devices, MCS is used to acquire local knowledge and to measure and map phenomena of common interest [1] , [2] , which has been employed in environmental, social, and other applications [3] - [5] .
One of the critical challenges of MCS systems is to develop effective incentive mechanisms in order to ensure users willingness to share their sensing data. The authors of [6] defined two incentive mechanisms, and for guaranteeing truthful bidding, they proposed the Msensing auction, which was shown vulnerable to users aiming to send malicious information. A reputation-aware (RA) incentive mechanism (TSCM) [7] was then proposed to address that problem.
In MCS system design, much less attention has been given to maximizing the CR. This is despite the fact that high CR implies higher quality of service, and maximizes the satisfaction of service demanders. In the rest of this paper, we use the terms clearance rate and task completion ratio interchangeably.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1) We propose two new bidding-based task allocation procedures for maximizing the number of covered tasks in a campaign. 2) We demonstrate a remarkable enhancement in task completion ratios compared to other methods in the recent literature.
II. AUCTIONS BASED ON DESCRIPTIVE BIDDING
For every campaign [8] , each smartphone i ∈ 1, · · · , N represents a participant in the auction, such that P is the set of participants. The platform, with budget B, sends the details of the M campaign tasks, where tasks are indexed by j ∈ 1, · · · , M . All of the participants should take part in the bidding process for the tasks they are interested in, and each bidder should at least bid on one task. Winner selection and payment determination algorithms are then used to find S and {P }, which are the set of primary winners and the set of the payments given to them, respectively. Two-stage Bidding. For a campaign with a set of tasks T , with cardinality |T | = M , every potential participant, who is interested in a subset of tasks T i ⊂ T , sends two types of bids to the platform, namely, a collective bid and a descriptive bid. The former is the classical form of bidding where the user asks for one collective payment in return for all the tasks in T i . In descriptive bidding, however, a participant sends a list of tasks and a separate bid for each of them-the list of per-task user bids.
Following previous work in the literature [7] , the algorithm starts by calculating the marginal contribution (or marginal value) for each participant, as formulated by [7] , and then subtracts their collective bids from the resultant value. Afterwards, tasks are allocated to a set of primary winners, that are chosen such that the budget (same as platform utility in [7] ) is maximized. The mathematical expression of the budget is given in 1.
Following the payment calculation for the primary winners, and given the budget of the platform, we can determine the remaining budget that is available-before getting a negative utility-to accomplish the tasks that had not been covered by primary winners. This is given by:
where V is the sum of campaign tasks values, and P is the sum of all payments to primary winners. Unless the set of M tasks have been covered by the primary winners, the platform proceeds to using the descriptive bids and determines a set of secondary winners, to whom the uncovered tasks are allocated. On the expense of the budget, the platform pays them in order to achieve a higher CR. Per-task Bidding. The 2SB algorithm starts off the auction with collective bidding and then handles the uncovered tasks using descriptive bidding. The per-task bidding (PTB) procedure, however, manages the whole auction, from the beginning, by descriptive bids.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The simulation is done in an area of (1000 m × 1000 m) in which participants, tasks, the participants' reputations, and the per-task bids are uniformly distributed. Following [6] , [7] , the value of each task (V j for task j) and the participants' collective bids vary uniformly in [1, 5] and [1, 10] respectively. We compare the performance of the reputation-aware (RA) and reputation-unaware (RU) versions of the 2SB and the PTB algorithms to two algorithms from the literature, namely, Msensing [6] and TSCM [7] as representatives of RU and RA techniques respectively. Two factors are considered in our simulations which are: the number of auctions, and the number of participants.
A. Simulation Results for Two-stage Bids
1) The impact of varying the number of auctions on the CR: As summarized in Table I , for both 2SB-RA and 2SB-RU, the CR achieved by the proposed method is close to three times higher than TSCM and Msensing. The average percentage of tasks completion is nearly constant, regardless the number of auctions. The number of auctions was varied from 100 to 1000 with increments of 100. The number of tasks and participants were both held constant to the value of 100.
2) The impact of varying the number of participants on the CR: As shown in Fig. 1 , when the number of participants increases, more candidates compete to be chosen by the platform. Hence, the probability of finding a set of candidates with high marginal contribution, within the platform budget, increases. Thus, the CR increases. Our proposed methods attain consistently higher CR, though, compared to the other techniques.
B. Simulation Results for Per-task Bidding
With regards to the impact of changing the number of auctions on the CR, similar to the 2SB case, the average percentage of tasks completion has been found to be nearly constant regardless the number of held auctions, and is given in Table I. 1) The impact of varying the number of auctions on the CR: Similar to the 2SB case, the average percentage of tasks completion is nearly constant regardless the number of held auctions. 11% for BPT where the TSCM was 4% and Msensing was nearly 7%. In the RU scenario, both of our algorithms reach the maximum reachable percentage due to budget availability-24%. 2) The impact of varying the number of participants on the CR: Increasing the number of participants generally leads to increasing the CR, since the platform has a richer pool of choices. Meanwhile, since the PTB uses descriptive bids only, which is budget-demanding, the 2SB and TSCM attain higher completion ratios on average.
IV. CONCLUSION
This research is the first to address the maximization of the CR in auction-based MCS systems by proposing novel bidding procedures. We simulated varying number of auctions and participants in order to evaluate the proposed techniques. Remarkable CR increase has been achieved; particularly, the 2SB algorithm has consistently outperformed the former reputationaware techniques.
